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On May 8, 1973, Amtrack officials in San Diego observed Gregory
Machado and Bridget Leary loading a brown footlocker onto a Boston-
bound train. The trunk was unusually heavy and leaking talcum powder,
a substance often used to disguise the odors of marihuana and hashish.
Their suspicions aroused,' the railroad officials reported the circum-
stances to federal authorities who in turn relayed the information to
their counterparts in Boston.2 Two days later, when the train reached
Boston, federal narcotics agents were waiting at the station. While they
had not obtained arrest or search warrants, they had with them a police
dog trained to detect marihuana.3 The agents released the dog near the
footlocker and, without alerting Machado and Leary, the dog signaled
the presence of a controlled substance inside. Joseph Chadwick then
joined Machado and Leary and they moved the footlocker into the
1. United States v. Chadwick, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 2479 (1977). Machado matched a
profile used by the Amtrack officials to spot drug traffickers. Profiles are used exten-
sively in connection with airport searches and are especially used for the detection of
potential hijackers. See generally United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972);
Note, The Antiskyjack System: A Matter of Search-or Seizure, 48 NOTRE DAME
LAWYER 1261 (1973).
2. Agents also sent detailed personal descriptions of the two suspects and the
footlocker. 97 S. Ct. at 2479.
3. Id. The courts are unsure as to whether the use of a canine's olfactory sense
constitutes a search. In United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975), a canine
was used to detect marihuana in defendant's suitcase at an airline terminal. The Second
Circuit held that the canine's "sniffing, nipping and biting at the defendant's luggage"
did not constitute a search. Id. at 461. A California case, United States v. Solis, 393 F.
Supp. 325 (C.D. Cal. 1975), rev'd, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976), originally held the use
of a canine to be a search, but was reversed by the Ninth Circuit. The cases purport to
speak to the reasonableness of the defendants' expectations of privacy, i.e., whether the
defendants had taken steps to protect their privacy, and also the degree of intrusion
involved by the use of the canine. See generally Comment, 42 Mo. L. REV. 331 (1977);
Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Use of Canines to Detect Evidence of Crime,
44 FORDHAM L. REV. 973 (1976).
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trunk of Chadwick's waiting automobile. While the trunk of the car was
still open and before the car engine had been started, the officers ar-
rested all three.'
Chadwick, Machado, and Leary, together with the footlocker and
car, were taken to the federal building. One and one-half hours after the
arrests, the agents opened the footlocker and found in it a large quantity
of marihuana. The three suspects were subsequently charged in a two-
count indictment with possessing marihuana with intent to distribute, 5
and with conspiring to possess with intent to distribute.6 Prior to their
trial, the defendants moved to suppress evidence of marihuana seized
from the footlocker.7 After an evidentiary hearing, the district court
ruled in the defendants' favor. 8 It later reaffirmed and amplified its
ruling after hearing the Government's motion for reconsideration.'
4. 97 S. Ct. at 2479. The dissent noted that "[pirobable cause for the arrest was
present from the time. . . the agents' dog signalled the presence of marihuana." Id. at
2489 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 2480. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)(1970) provides: "Except as authorized...
it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a
controlled substance."
6. 97 S. Ct. at 2480. 21 U.S.C. § 846(1970) provides: "Any person who attempts
or conspires to commit any offense. . . is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both
which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commis-
sion of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy."
7. 97 S. Ct. at 2480. Marihuana was also found in suitcases carried by the re-
spondents. Id. at n. 1. The federal authorities sought to justify the search of the locked
suitcases as "inventory searches" according to established DEA procedure. United
States v. Chadwick, 532 F.2d 773, 782-83 (1st Cir. 1976). The court of appeals sup-
pressed the evidence, finding no justification for the warrantless suitcase search. Id. The
petition for certiorari was framed only on the question of the footlocker search, i.e.,
whether a search warrant was required before federal agents could open a lawfully
seized footlocker when there was probable cause to believe that the footlocker con-
tained contraband. Therefore, the Court did not discuss the legality of Chadwick's
arrest or the search of the suitcases. 97 S. Ct. at 2480 n. 1.
8. United States v. Chadwick, 393 F. Supp. 763 (D. Mass. 1975), noting that
"[wiarrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject to a few carefully delineated
and limited exceptions." Id. at 771. The court rejected the automobile exception analogy
as well as the exception applicable to a search incident to an arrest, saying that the
footlocker was not part of the area from which the respondents might gain possession
of a weapon or destructible evidence. Id. at 771-75.
9. Id. at 773. "The Government's original opposition to defendant's motion to
suppress the fruits of the footlocker search was based exclusively on the automobile
exception to the search warrant requirement. (See [Id. at] 767-68). The Government
now asserts that [the] search should be justified as one incident to arrest." Id. at 774.
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A divided First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression
of the seized marihuana.'" While the court agreed that the agents had
probable cause to believe that the footlocker contained a controlled
substance, it held that probable cause alone was insufficient to sustain
a warrantless search." On the premise that warrantless searches are per
se unreasonable unless they fall within some established exception to the
warrant requirement, the court of appeals agreed with the district court
that the footlocker search was justified neither as an automobile search
nor as a search incident to a lawful arrest.' 2
The United States Supreme Court affirmed and HELD: (1) the
warrant clause does not protect only dwellings and other specifically
designated locales; (2) by placing personal effects inside a footlocker,
the defendants manifested an expectation that the contents would re-
main private; (3) the footlocker's mobility did not justify the application
of the warrant exception which applies in cases involving automobiles;
and (4) a warrantless search of luggage or other property confiscated
at the time of arrest cannot be based on the exception which applies to
a search incident to an arrest if the search is remote in time or place
from the arrest or if no exigency exists. 13
There is no constitutional rule under the fourth amendment 4 more
basic than that which makes a warrantless search unreasonable except
in a few "jealously and carefully drawn" unique circumstances.'" The
first clause of the fourth amendment requires that all searches and
seizures-even without a warrant-be reasonable. Reasonableness
The district court, in a supplemental opinion, disagreed with this latest contention and
reaffirmed its opinion of Jan. 13, 1975, denying the motion to vacate. Id. at 778.
10. United States v. Chadwick, 532 F.2d 773 (1st Cir. 1976).
11. Id. at 778-82.
12. Id. at 782. The court of appeals conceded that personalty shared some charac-
teristics of mobility which support warrantless automobile searches, but felt that a rule
permitting a search of personalty on probable cause alone had not "received sufficient
recognition by the Supreme Court outside the automobile area. . . for us to recognize
it as a valid exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement." Id. at 781.
13. 97 S. Ct. 2476.
14. The fourth amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 427 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring),
quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958). See Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).
161 1
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implies a weighing of the interests presented in each case. 6 The fourth
amendment's second clause provides for the issuance of warrants only
upon probable cause. 17 The Supreme Court has rejected the argument
that a law enforcement officer's own determination of probable cause
to search a private place for contraband or evidence of a crime should
excuse his failure to procure a warrant beforehand.' 8 Mr. Justice
Jackson explained this principle in Johnson v. United States:
Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disin-
terested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers
in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a
nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police
officers. . . . When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the
right of a search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a
policeman or a government agent. 9
While a warrant from a "neutral and detached" magistrate is pre-
ferred,"0 there are a few well-recognized exceptions permitting warrant-
less intrusions where circumstances make it impossible or impractical
to obtain a warrant.' The Chadwick decision discusses several of these
exceptions to the warrant requirement, but, more important, it generally
traces the extensive history of search and seizure. The majority opinion
can be readily divided into three areas: (1) the reasonable expectation
of privacy; (2) the automobile exception; and (3) the search incident to
an arrest analogy. The latter two areas are also directed to issues of
privacy.
The Court first turned its attention to the question of whether the
16. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967).
17. The Court has not attempted a definition of probable cause more precise than
the one in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925), where the standard was
defined as "facts and circumstances . . . such as to warrant a man of [reasonable]
prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been committed."
18. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 450; Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-58 (1967).
19. 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
20. Id.
21. The recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement are (1) hot pursuit,
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); (2) plain view doctrine, Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); (3) stop and frisk, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968);
(4) automobile search, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); (5) consent,
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); and (6) search incident to lawful
arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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warrantless search of the footlocker was reasonable. The Government
contended that the fourth amendment "protects only [those] interests
traditionally identified with the home," and in this context, "the deter-
mination [of] whether a search or seizure is reasonable should turn on
whether a warrant has been obtained." 2 According to this argument,
the Government asserted that seizures of personal effects outside the
home, based on probable cause but without a warrant, are not
"unreasonable." 3 The Court disputed the Government's claim by not-
ing language in Katz v. United States:u "[T]he Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places."' Stating that the warrant clause does not
protect only dwellings and other specifically designated locales, the
Court wrote:
[TIhe Warrant Clause does not in terms distinguish between searches
conducted in private homes and other searches. There is also a strong
historical connection between the Warrant Clause and the initial clause
of the Fourth Amendment which draws no distinctions among "persons,
houses, papers, and effects" in guarding against unreasonable searches
and seizures.6
22. 97 S. Ct. at 2481.
23. Id.
24. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The landmark case of Katz established the reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test to determine whether a particular intrusion comes within the
fourth amendment. In Katz, the petitioner was convicted of transmitting wagering
information by telephone across state lines. The conversations were overheard by FBI
agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the telephone
booth from which the calls were made. The Court held that the Government's activities
violated the petitioner's privacy and thus constituted a search and seizure within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. Id. at 350-53. However, Katz stated that the fourth
amendment could not be translated into a general constitutional right to privacy. While
people, not places, are protected under the fourth amendment, "[w]hat a person know-
ingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of fourth
amendment protection." Id. at 351. "But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Id. at 351-52.
25. 97 S. Ct. at 2481. The Chadwick Court accentuated the fact that the fourth
amendment protects people from unreasonable governmental intrusions into their legiti-
mate expectations of privacy and that the warrant clause contributes to that protection.
Id. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589 (1974), citing Jones v. United States, 357
U.S. 493, 498 (1958). No concise definition of "expectation of privacy" was offered,
nor has the Court concretely defined it in the past. Long ago, the Court in Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886), did say that "constitutional provisions for the
security of person and property should be liberally construed."
26. 97 S. Ct. at 2482.
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Analysis of past decisions involving search and seizure situations
reveals that "[tlhe ultimate standard set forth is reasonableness. 2 7 And
in examining the fourth amendment, the Court has considered whether
a search and seizure is reasonable under the circumstances.2 In Camara
v. Municipal Court it stated: "[T]here can be no ready test for determin-
ing reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against
the invasion which the search entails. 129 Further, "[t]he test of reason-
ableness cannot be fixed by per se rules; each case must be decided on
its own facts.""° Justice Frankfurther wrote in his vigorous dissent in
United States v. Rabinowitz:
To tear "unreasonable" from the content and history and purpose of the
Fourth Amendment . . . is to disregard the reason to which reference
must be made when a question arises under the Fourth Amendment ...
The test by which searches and seizures must be judged is whether con-
duct is consonant with the aim of the Fourth Amendment. The main aim
• . . is against invasion of the right of privacy to one's effects and papers
without regard to the result of such invasion.3
The Court in Cady v. Dombrowski said:
In construing this command [for reasonableness], there has been general
agreement that "except in certain carefully defined classes of cases a
search of private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless
it has been authorized by a valid search warrant. '3 2
27. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973). See Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 528-29.
28. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967).
29. 387 U.S. 523, 536-37. In Camara, the appellant was charged with violating
the San Francisco Housing Code for refusing, after efforts to secure his consent, to
allow a warrantless inspection of the ground-floor quarters which were used for residen-
tial purposes. The Court held that warrantless administrative searches cannot be justi-
fied on the grounds that they make demands on occupants; that warrants in such cases
are unfeasible; or that area inspection programs could not function under reasonable
search warrant requirements. The Court wrote: "The warrant procedure is designed to
guarantee that a decision to search private property is justified by a reasonable public
interest. . . . [R]easonableness is still the ultimate standard. . . . It [the warrant]
merely gives full recognition to the competing government and private interests . . .
and, in so doing, best fulfills the historic purpose behind the constitutional right to be
free from unreasonable government invasions of privacy." Id. at 539.
30. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 509-10 (Black, J., concurring, and
dissenting) (emphasis added).
31. 339 U.S. 56, 80 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
32. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 439, quoting language from Camara v.
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In this context, the Chadwick Court looked to the role of the
judicial warrant and the safeguards that a neutral magistrate pro-
vides.3 The Court has always emphasized the preference for a warrant
issued by a "neutral and detached" magistrate." It wrote in McDonald
v. United States:
We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a search warrant
serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth
Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the
police. . . . The right of privacy was deemed to be too precious to entrust
to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and arrest
of criminals. . ..
In Chadwick, the Court stressed that the judicial warrant protec-
tions are effective whether applied in or out of the home .3 As such,
judicial warrants have been required for searches in areas other than the
home.37 These instances "reflect the settled constitutional principle
. . . that a fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safe-
guard individuals from unreasonable government invasions of legitimate
privacy interests, and not simply those interests found inside the four
walls of the home."' '
In recognizing that a citizen's privacy interests extend beyond the
home, the Court pointed out that by placing their personal property
inside a double-locked footlocker, the defendants had "manifested an
expectation that the contents would remain free from public examina-
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 528-29; see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
at 454-55.
33. 97 S. Ct. at 2482.
34. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
35. 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948).
36. 97 S. Ct. at 2482. The Court has considered warrantless searches in a variety
of settings, further emphasizing that the fourth amendment is not limited to dwellings.
See, e.g., United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (first class mail search);
Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960) (package search).
37. 97 S. Ct. at 2483. The Court cited Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(electronic interception of conversation in a public telephone booth); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (automobile on private premises); Preston v. United States,
376 U.S. 364 (1964) (automobile in custody); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48
(1951) (hotel room); Mancusi v. De Forte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (office).
38. 97 S. Ct. at 2483. See also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), where
Justice Frankfurter wrote: "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by
the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society."
165 1
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tion."39 The Court wrote: "No less than one who locks the doors of his
home against intruders, one who safeguards his personal possessions in
this manner is due the protection of the Fourth Amendment Warrant
Clause."4 Since the Government could find no exigency calling for an
immediate search, the Court felt "it was unreasonable for the Govern-
ment to conduct [the] search without the safeguards a judicial warrant
provides."'"
While examining the warrantless search of the footlocker, the
Court also looked at the issue of whether the warrantless search fit
within one of the exceptions to the constitutional requirement of a war-
rant.4" The Court has held on numerous occasions that "searches con-
ducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions."43 The exceptions are "jealously and carefully drawn,""
requiring "a showing by those who seek exemption. . . that the exigen-
cies of the situation made that course imperative. '45
In Chadwick the Government sought to justify the warrantless
search of the footlocker under the so-called automobile exception46 and
alternatively as a search incident to arrest.47 It argued that since the
39. 97 S. Ct. at 2483.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. A search without a warrant can be justified if it meets the criteria of some
exception to the warrant requirement: (1) hot pursuit or exigent circumstances; (2) plain
view; (3) stop and frisk; (4) automobile search; (5) consent; and (6) search incident to
lawful arrest. See note 21, supra.
43. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, quoted in Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55. See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29; United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411, 425 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
44. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
45. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
46. 97 S. Ct. at 2483-84. The lower courts noted that there was no nexus between
the search and the automobile, merely a coincidence. Both courts emphasized that the
search was of a footlocker, not an automobile; and the search itself did not take place
in the automobile. 393 F. Supp. at 772; 532 F.2d at 778. After finding no exigency that
would justify the search based on the automobile exception requirement, the district
court wrote: "To rule otherwise would be to establish a per se rule permitting a warrant-
less search any time an automobile was even remotely involved in an arrest." 393 F.
Supp. at 773.
47. 97 S. Ct. at 2485. In dealing with the Government's argument that the foot-
locker could be searched as incident to arrest, both lower courts found that the 200-
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vehicle itself could have been searched without a warrant, so could the
footlocker, as it was "analogous to motor vehicles for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes."4 The Government drew this analogy by arguing to the
Court that both automobiles and footlockers are mobile "effects." 49 The
Government's other argument was that since "the footlocker was seized
contemporaneously with the defendants' arrests and searched shortly
thereafter, such a search should be viewed as falling within the exception
of a search incident to arrest."9 0
In examining the Government's two contentions, the Court first
focused on the automobile exception analogy. The history of the auto-
mobile exception" cases is intricate and extensive. Beginning with
Carroll" and the exigent circumstances of mobility, 3 the Court has
pound footlocker could not be encompassed in the phrase "area within his immediate
control." The courts pointed out that (1) the footlocker was not hand-carried luggage
and (2) at the time of arrest the defendants had been handcuffed and surrounded by law
enforcement officials. 393 F. Supp. at 775; 532 F.2d at 780.
48. 97 S. Ct. at 2484.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2485.
51. The automobile exception is one of the six exceptions to the warrant require-
ment. See Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures ofAutomobiles, 87 HARV. L. REV.
835 (1974).
52. The "automobile exception" was specifically established in 1925 in Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In this case, George Carroll and John Kiro were
stopped by federal prohibition agents on a road between Detroit and Grand Rapids,
having been suspected of carrying contraband liquor. They had been seen traveling the
same road before, and two of the agents had previously tried to buy liquor from the
two suspects. Having stopped the car, the agents searched it and found bottles of gin
and whiskey stashed inside the seats. The Court held that the "facts and circumstances
within [the agents'] knowledge and of which they had reasonable trustworthy informa-
tion were sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that intoxicating liquor was being transported in the automobile which they stopped and
searched." Id. at 162.
53. In Carroll, the moving car on an open highway created exigent circumstances
justifying a warrantless search and seizure. Id. at 153. The "automobile exception" has
since been well-delineated in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) and Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.443. Coolidge, citing Chambers, mentioned the established
Carroll doctrine: exigent circumstances justify the warrantless search of an automobile
stopped on the highway, where there is probable cause, because the car is "movable,
the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be found again if a warrant
must be obtained." The Court emphasized that the "opportunity to search is fleeting."
Id. at 460.
In Chambers, the Court seemed to expand Carroll by implying that potential
mobility of the car was sufficient to create exigent circumstances. The petitioner was
9
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continued to expand the area of automobile search and seizure in the
recent cases involving state forfeiture statutes54 and automobile inven-
tory situations.55
arrested after the auto in which he was riding was stopped by the police shortly after
the robbery of a service station. The car was driven to the police station and was later
searched. The Court validated the search, saying that exigent circumstances existed
because the car was readily movable. 399 U.S. at 51. Mr. Justice White claimed that
"[tihe probable cause factor still obtained at the station house and so did the mobility
of the car .. " Id. at 52.
In Coolidge, which also established the doctrine of plain view and the requirement
of inadvertent discovery, the decision asserted that there had to be some real possibility
of the car's being moved in order for Carroll to apply. The Court wrote: "The word
'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away
and disappears." 403 U.S. at 461-62. In Coolidge, the petitioner was being held in jail
on a first-degree murder charge and his car, suspected of being an instrumentality of
the crime, was parked in the driveway of his home. The Court felt that no amount of
probable cause could justify a warrantless search or seizure in the absence of exigent
circumstances. Since the petitioner had no access to his car and the police had ample
opportunity to obtain a warrant, the seizure was held unconstitutional, as was the search
of the car at the station house. Id. at 472-73. In this case, contraband, stolen goods, or
objects dangerous in themselves were not involved.
54. In Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), the Court held legitimate a
search conducted long after any exigency had passed on the basis that the police had a
possessory interest in the vehicle under a state forfeiture statute. The defendant was
arrested for violation of narcotics laws, and his automobile was seized by police officers
pursuant to a California statute authorizing any state officer making an arrest for a
narcotics violation to seize and deliver to the State Division of Narcotic Enforcement
any vehicle used to store, conceal, transport, or facilitate the possession of narcotics.
The vehicle was then to be held as evidence until a forfeiture had been declared or a
release ordered. The Court held that in the particular circumstances involved, the police
did not violate the fourth amendment by conducting a search of a car which they validly
held for use as evidence in a forfeiture proceeding. Id. at 61-62.
55. In an inventory search, the contents of the car are thoroughly cataloged and
criminal evidence is seized, if discovered, without a warrant. The police seek to justify
their intrusion as based on a benign purpose, i.e., the protection of public safety, protec-
tion of the driver's property, or the protection of the police from danger against theft.
See Lawfulness of "Inventory Search" of Motor Vehicle Impounded by Police, 48
A.L.R. 3d 537 (1973); and Moylan, The Inventory Search of an Automobile: A Willing
Suspension of Disbelief, 5 U. OF BALT. L. REv. 203 (1976).
The Court held in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, that warrantless searches
are permissible to "discharge community caretaking functions" and found the search
of the car justified by reason of concern for the safety of the general public. Id. at 447-
48.
In this case, the police arrested an off-duty policeman for drunken driving, after a
late-night accident. The vehicle was towed to a private garage at the police's direction,
and the trunk was searched pursuant to standard procedures of that police department.
1168 2:1978 1
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Throughout the automobile exception cases, the Court has drawn
a distinction between automobiles, homes, and offices. Although auto-
mobiles are "effects" and thus within the reach of the fourth amend-
ment,51 warrantless examinations have been upheld in circumstances
where a search of a home or office would not be. 7 The reason for this
While no probable cause existed to indicate that the vehicle contained fruits of a crime,
the protective search was instituted because the local police were under the impression
that the incapacitated Chicago police officer was required to carry his service revolver
at all times; the police had reasonable ground to believe a weapon might be in the car
and thus susceptible to vandals. In the process of the search, the police uncovered blood-
stained objects which led to Dombrowski's conviction for murder.
The Court in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), divided 5-4 on the
issue of whether an inventory of a car towed in for multiple parking violations was a
search. The opinion indicated that even if the inventory was a search, it was reasonable.
Id. at 376. The Court's determination of the reasonableness of the search was predicated
on the assumption that inventories were standard procedure in the police community.
Id.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Powell indicated that "routine inventories of
automobiles intrude upon an area in which the private citizen has a 'reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy'; thus despite their benign purpose when conducted by government
officials they constitute 'searches' for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at
377 n. I.
In Opperman, the Court upheld the warrantless seizure of an item from an un-
locked glove compartment. The search occurred while the police were inventorying the
personal items in an automobile which they had impounded because it was illegally
parked. The inventory was prompted by the presence of a number of valuables inside
the car which were in plain view. The Court addressed itself only to the inventory of
the unlocked glove compartment and did not deal with the question of inventorying
locked or closed containers found in the vehicle. (This unsettled question came back to
haunt the Court in the Chadwick decision. Mr. Justice Brennan briefly discusses it in
the concurring opinion, 97 S. Ct. at 2486 n.1.) However, the reasoning applied by the
majority and Mr. Justice Powell would permit inventories of locked or closed containers
for security purposes if the vehicle was to be impounded for a significant period of time.
56. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 439.
57. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589 (1974) (plurality opinion). See Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 439-40; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 48. In Cooper v.
California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), the Court read Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364
(1964), as dealing primarily with a search incident to arrest and cited that case for the
proposition that the mobility of a car may make the search of a car without a warrant
reasonable "although the result might be the opposite in a search of a home, a store,
or other fixed piece of property." 386 U.S. at 59.
In Cardwell, law enforcement officers interviewed the respondent in connection
with a murder and viewed his automobile, which was thought to have been used in the
commission of a crime. Several months later he was questioned again at the office of
investigating authorities. At this time, he had parked his car at a nearby public commer-
cial parking lot. After his arrest his car was impounded and later examined.
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distinction is two-fold. First, the inherent mobility of automobiles cre-
ates exigent circumstances which, as a practical necessity, make strict
adherence to the warrant requirement impossible.58 The Court has also
sustained warrantless searches where no immediate danger existed that
the car would be removed from the jurisdiction.59 Besides the exigency
of mobility, other reasons exist to justify the application of less rigorous
warrant requirements to automobile searches. For one thing, the expec-
tation of privacy in a car is significantly less than in one's home or
office.6" Automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to governmental reg-
ulations such as licensing and inspections." In the interest of public
safety and as part of what the Court has called "community care-taking
functions," automobiles are frequently taken into police custody. 2 Po-
lice will also remove and impound automobiles which violate parking
ordinances, thereby jeopardizing both public safety and the efficient
movement of traffic.63 The expectation of privacy is further diminished
by the public nature of automobile travel. 4 The Court noted in Cardwell
The warrantless search revealed that tire-prints taken from the scene of the crime
and paint samples from the victim's car matched those found on respondent's car. While
there was only a remote possibility of anyone's destroying the evidence or moving the
car, the Court reasoned that the automobile was located in a "public place where access
was not meaningfully restricted." 417 U.S. at 593, following Chambers but distinguish-
ing Coolidge. Citing from Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the Court said that
the primary object of the fourth amendment is the protection of privacy, but the search
in this case, made on the basis of probable cause, infringed no expectation of privacy.
417 U.S. at 591-92.
58. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54; Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. at 459-60.
59. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 441-42. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 48; Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58; and Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975)
(auto exception case reasoned on the rationale of Chambers).
60. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. at 590-91.
61. "In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and See v. City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), the Court held that a warrant was required to effect an
unconsented administrative entry and inspection of private dwellings or commercial
premises to ascertain health or safety conditions. In contrast, this procedure has never
been held applicable to automobile inspections for safety purposes." South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367-68 n.2.
62. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 441.
63. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364. See Harris v. United States, 390
U.S. 234 (1968) (inventory situation), where the Court held that an intrusion was
justifiable since it was "taken to protect the car while it was in police custody." Id. at
236.
64. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. at 591.
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v. Lewis:6 "One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle
because its function is transportation and it seldoms serves as one's
residence or as the repository of personal effects. . . .It travels public
thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain
view." 6"
In the present case, the Court would not analogize luggage to
motor vehicles, even though both automobiles and the footlocker could
be termed "effects" under the fourth amendment." In stating that a
"person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially
greater than in an automobile,"" the Court distinguished between the
diminished expectations of privacy in an automobile and the fact that
luggage contents are not generally open to public view (except as a
condition to border entry); nor is luggage required to be regularly in-
spected; and finally, luggage (unlike a car) is intended as a "repository
of personal effects."69
The Court also rejected the argument that by "analogy to the
automobile exception" the footlocker's mobility justified dispensing
with the need for a search warrant. 70 While the Court noted that the size
65. 417 U.S. 583.
66. 97 S. Ct. at 2484.
67. Id. The Court would not broaden the moving vehicle exception to include
other mobile chattels. It noted that automobiles are typically subject to wide regulation
but that locked trunks are not.
68. 97 S. Ct. at 2484. In its reasoning, the Court cited to many "automobile
exception" cases which illustrate the various factors and situations wherein the expecta-
tion of privacy in automobiles is diminished. However, the Court did not specifically
analyze any particular case in relation to the situation presented in Chadwick.
69. "[The defendants'] principal privacy interest in the footlocker was of course
not in the container itself, which was exposed to public view, but in its contents." Id. at
2485 n.8.
70. Id. at 2484. The First Circuit Court of Appeals examined the mobility of
luggage and wrote: "Admittedly baggage or goods in transit present some of the same
characteristics as automobiles." United States v. Chadwick, 532 F.2d at 781. The court
of appeals noted that other circuits had liberalized luggage search rules, drawing heavily
on the rationale underlying the automobile search exception in Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42. Those courts would allow the warrantless search of luggage for contraband
upon the individual officer's determination of probable cause. (The Chambers automo-
bile search exception itself is of a somewhat broader character than other exceptions; it
does not, for example, require an accompanying arriest.)
However, the First Circuit argued that Carroll and its progeny had not mentioned
baggage as being comparable to vehicles and further noted that exceptions to the war-
rant rule are "specially established" and "well-delineated." 532 F.2d at 781.
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and inherent mobility of a vehicle make it susceptible to theft or intru-
sion by vandals,7 it wrote in Chadwick:
[OInce the federal agents had seized it [the footlocker] at the railroad
station and had safely transferred it to the Boston federal building under
their exclusive control there was not the slightest danger that the foot-
locker or its contents could have been removed before a valid search
warrant could be obtained. . . . With the footlocker safely immobilized,
it was unreasonable to undertake the additional and greater intrusion of
a search without a warrant."
Secondly, the Court examined whether the footlocker search in
Chadwick could be viewed as being a search incident to arrest. A search
incident to a custodial arrest has long been recognized as an exception
to the warrant requirement.73 Chimel v. California,74 overruling the
earlier decisions of Harris v. United States75 and United States v.
71. 97 S. Ct. at 2484 n.7.
72. Id. at 2484-85. See also n.8, distinguishing Chadwick from Chambers.
73. Approval of a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest seems to have
been first articulated by the Court in 1914 as dictum in Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 392 (1914). Weeks made no reference to any right to search the place where
the arrest occurs, but was limited to a right to search the person.
In Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), citing to dicta in Carroll and
Weeks, the Court wrote:
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons
lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search the place where the arrest
is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or
as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to
effect an escape from custody is not to be doubted.
Id. at 30. See also the cases following Agnello involving search incident to arrest:
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,
282 U.S. 344 (1931); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
74. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In Chimel, the petitioner was arrested at his home for
the burglary of a coin shop. While the police had a valid arrest warrant, no search
warrant had been issued. The officers looked through the three-bedroom house, direct-
ing Chimel's wife to open drawers in the master bedroom and sewing room. After they
completed the search they seized numerous items-primarily coins, but also medals,
tokens, and other objects. The Court held that the scope of the search was unreasonable
under the fourth and fourteenth amendments, as it "went far beyond petitioner's person
and the area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon or something
that could have been used as evidence against him." Id. at 768. Chimel pointed out that
what is "reasonable" in a particular situation "must be viewed in the light of established
fourth amendment principles." Id. at 765.
75. 331 U.S. 145 (1947). Harris was arrested in his apartment, having allegedly
been involved with the cashing and interstate transportation of a forged check. The
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Rabinowitz,76 held that an arresting officer may search the arrested
person and the area "within his immediate control"-construing that
phrase to mean the area from which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence. 71
In Chimel the majority sought to establish guidelines for a search
incident to an arrest. In doing so the Court used two previous decisions,
Terry v. Ohio"5 and a companion case, Sibron v. New York, 7 conclud-
officers, in an attempt to recover two cancelled checks thought to have been used in
effecting the forgery, undertook a thorough search of the apartment. In the course of
the search, the officers found altered Selective Service documents, and Harris was later
convicted for violating the Selective Service Act of 1940. The Court rejected Harris's
fourth amendment claim, sustaining the search as "incident to arrest." Id. at 150-51.
76. 339 U.S. 56 (1950). This case introduced the "broad scope" search incident
phase which replaced the "narrow scope" phase of Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S.
699 (1948). The theory formerly espoused by the Court held that a search warrant must
always be obtained, unless it was impractical to do so. Trupiano set forth the "necessity"
rationale.
Rabinowitz was arrested at his office by federal authorities who had been informed
that the defendant was dealing in stamps bearing forged overprints. At the time of the
arrest the officers searched the desk, file cabinets, and safe in the office, seizing a large
number of stamps with forged overprints. The Court held that the search in its entirety
fell within the principle giving law enforcement authorities "[tihe right to search the
place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the
crime. . . " 339 U.S. at 61 (quoting Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392). According to the lan-
guage of Rabinowitz, the ultimate fourth amendment test "is not whether it is reasona-
ble to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable." Id. at 66.
Chimel defined Rabinowitz as standing for the proposition that "a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest may generally extend to the area that is considered to be in
the possession or under the control of the person arrested." 395 U.S. at 760.
77. Id. at 762-63. The Court applied the basic rule that the "search incident to
arrest" is an exception to the warrant requirement and that its scope must be strictly
confined in terms of the "justifying" exigent circumstances. The exigency in question
arises from the dangers of harm to the arresting officer and of destruction of evidence
within the reach of the arrestee.
78. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the Court upheld a protective "stop and search"
of the petitioner where it was limited to a pat-down of the defendant's outer clothing.
Id. at 29-30. Terry dealt with a permissible "frisk" incident to an investigative stop
based on less than probable cause to arrest. A police officer stopped Terry and his
companions because they had been behaving "suspiciously." The officer questioned the
men and, believing them to be carrying weapons, engaged in a pat-down of their outer
garments. The Court held that the search is reasonable if the officer concludes that the
person may be armed and dangerous and that preventive action is necessary to protect
himself and others. Under these conditions, the officer is entitled to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing for weapons. Such a search is constitutionally
privileged, even though the officer does not have probable cause to effect a search.
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ing that a search incident to a custodial arrest must be related to the
purpose for which the arrest was effected.8"
The Chimel opinion also addressed itself to the issue of contempo-
raneity,81 meaning the search should occur at the time and place of the
arrest. The Court had previously discussed the contemporaneous re-
quirement in Preston v. United States,2 where a parked car in which
the defendants were arrested was later towed to the police garage and
subsequently searched. There the Court noted that the justifications for
a seizure in accordance with a search incident to an arrest are "absent
where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest."' '
Several years after Chimel, the trend became somewhat different.
As evidenced by the recent case of United States v. Robinson" and its
companion 'case, Gustafson v. Florida," the Burger Court seems to have
retreated from Chimel. In the Gustafson and Robinson cases, illegal
drugs were seized during a full search of the defendants following an
arrest for a traffic violation.86 These two cases seemed to reduce the
79. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). In Sibron, the Court invalidated a seizure of heroin
resulting from a police officer's going beyond an exterior pat-down and thrusting his
hand into defendant's pocket when the officer had no probable cause to arrest and no
reason to believe defendant was armed and dangerous. Id. at 63-65.
80. The Chimel Court wrote: "Only last term in Terry v. Ohio. . .we empha-
sized that 'the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of
searches and seizures through the warrant procedure' . . . and that '[tihe scope of [a]
search must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its
initiation permissible."' 395 U.S. at 762.
81. 395 U.S. at 764.
82. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
83. Id. at 367. In the same term as Preston, the Court noted in Stoner v. Califor-
nia, 376 U.S. 483, reh. denied, 377 U.S. 940 (1964), that "a search can be incident to
an arrest only if it is substantially contemporaneous* with the arrest and is confined to
the immediate vicinity of the arrest." 376 U.S. at 486.
84. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
85. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
86. In Robinson, a police officer, having probable cause to arrest the respondent
for driving while his license was revoked (as a result of his having previously checked
respondent's operator permit, made a full custodial arrest). In the pat-down search of
defendant's body, the officer found a crumpled cigarette package containing heroin in
his coat pocket.
In Gustafson, the defendant, driving a car with out-of-state license tags, was ob-
served by a policeman on a routine patrol. It appeared to the officer that the car was
weaving back and forth across the center lines of the road. After being stopped, the
petitioner could not produce his driver's license, explaining that he was a college student
and that his license was in his dormitory room. The officer took the petitioner into
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Terry rationale that a search must be related to the circumstances sur-
rounding the arrest, since the searches in Gustafson and Robinson were
unrelated to the circumstances of the arrests, and the officers had no
reason to believe the defendants were armed and dangerous.81 The Court
in Robinson relied upon a "reasonableness test," not unlike the one
used earlier in the Rabinowitz decision," and found that a custodial
arrest is a "reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment [and]
that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no
additional justification." 9
The Court again broadened the scope of the search-incident excep-
tion in United States v. Edwards," where it loosely interpreted the
requirement that a search and seizure be contemporaneous with the
arrest. In Edwards the clothing worn by the defendant was seized ten
hours after his arrest and incarceration.91 Mr. Justice White, writing for
the majority, said that "[a] reasonable delay in effectuating [the seizure]
does not change the fact that [the defendant] was no more imposed upon
than he could have been at the time and place of the arrest or immedi-
ately upon arrival at the place of detention. 12
In Chadwick, the Government argued that the Constitution permits
a warrantless search of any property in the possession of a person
arrested in public as long as there is probable cause to believe that the
property contains contraband or evidence of a crime. The Court re-
jected this argument by finding no exigencies which would have justified
custody for further questioning and engaged in a pat-down search of the defendant,
placing his hand inside the defendant's belt and pockets. A cigarette box containing
marihuana was found in the petitioner's left front coat pocket.
87. 414 U.S. at 228; 414 U.S. at 264.
88. 339 U.S. at 65-66.
89. 414 U.S. at 235. Mr. Justice Rehnquist stated:
It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and
we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is
not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but
is also a 'reasonable' search under the Amendment.
90. 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
91. The defendant was arrested and charged with the attempted breaking and
entering of a United States Post Office. He and a companion were seen walking near
the Post Office after police had been notified that a secret alarm had been activated.
Edwards was arrested, and ten hours after his incarceration his clothes were seized
without a warrant and paint chips were found on the clothing which matched those
samples taken from the Post Office.
92. 415 U.S. at 805.
93. 97 S. Ct. at 2485.
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an immediate search. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, distin-
guished searches incident to an arrest (as in custodial arrest) and those
searches where items are seized contemporaneously with the arrest.94
Referring to Robinson and Terry, the majority opinion stated: "The
potential dangers lurking in all custodial arrests make warrantless
searches of items within the 'immediate control' area reasonable with-
out requiring the arresting officer to calculate the probability that weap-
ons or destructible evidence may be involved."95
The Court pointed out that the situation in Chadwick was different
from that of Robinson and Terry. Since the luggage was in the exclusive
control of the law enforcement officers and no danger existed that the
arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy
evidence, a search of that property was no longer incident to the arrest.96
Expanding its reasoning further, the Court cited Preston v. United
States97 and said: "Warrantless searches of luggage or other property
seized at time of an arrest cannot be justified as incident to that arrest
either if the 'search is remote in time or place from the arrest.' "98
The Court emphasized the fact in Chadwick that the search was
conducted more than an hour after the agents had gained exclusive
control of the footlocker.9 As a consequence, the Court could not view
the search "as incidental to the arrest or as justified by any other exi-
gency."1 0° Because there was no exigency which would have supported
the need for an immediate search, the Court reasoned that the defend-
ants were entitled to the protection of the warrant clause. 0' In conclu-
sion, the Court said that in this case an evaluation by a neutral magis-
trate was needed before the defendants' privacy interests in the contents
of the footlocker could be invaded. 0 2
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2485. The Court mentioned justifications for a warrantless search of
luggage taken from a suspect at the time of his arrest; for example, if the officers have
reason to believe that the luggage contains some immediately dangerous instrumentality
such as explosives. Id. at 2485 n.9.
96. Id. at 2485.
97. 376 U.S. at 367.
98. 97 S. Ct. at 2485.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2485-86.
101. Id.
102. Id. The Court distinguished searches of possessions within an arrestee's
immediate control and searches of the person. The Court said that the defendants'
expectation of privacy in possessions (contents of the footlocker) was not reduced or
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The dissenting members,' ° applying the rationale of the warrant
exceptions concerning automobiles and searches incident to custodial
arrests, would hold generally that "a [search] warrant is not required
to seize and search any movable property in the possession of a person
properly arrested in a public place."'0 4 The dissent distinguished
Camara v. Municipal Court"5 and United States v. Watson"' by saying:
"A search warrant serves additional functions where an arrest takes
place in a home or office. . . .But a warrant would serve none of these
functions where the arrest takes place in a public area and the authori-
ties are admittedly empowered to seize the objects in question."'0 7
The dissent then suggested that a clear-cut rule be adopted permit-
ting property (seized in conjunction with a valid arrest in a public place)
to be searched without a warrant.'
While the dissenting members agreed with the majority in their
discussion of the privacy interest generally,0 9 they were critical of the
opinion's failure to define explicitly the narrow line between searches of
possessions and searches of the person in relation to expectations of
privacy."10 As a possible limitation to the impact of the decision, the
dissent pointed out that other doctrines are frequently available to sus-
tain warrantless searches of objects in police custody."'
eliminated simply because they were under arrest. Id. n.10.
103. Mr. Justice Blackmun, with whom Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined, dissenting.
104. 97 S. Ct. at 2487. The dissent relies particularly on United States v. Robin-
son (no warrant is required for the arresting officer to search the clothing and effects
of one placed in custodial arrest); and United States v. Edwards (search of personal
effects need not be contemporaneous with the arrest). The dissent also paid close atten-
tion to the cases'where a car may be impounded and, with probable cause, the contents
(including locked compartments) may be examined without a warrant. See, e.g., Cady
v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 439-48; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 47-52; Texas
v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975). See also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)
(police may follow standard procedures of inventorying contents of an impounded vehi-
cle without any showing of probable cause).
105. 387 U.S. 523.
106. 423 U.S. 411.
107. 97 S. Ct. at 2488 n.1.
108. Id. at 2489.
109. Id. at 2488.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2488-89. The dissent speaks of the routine inventory established by
South Dakota v. Opperman, and also of instances where the impounded object has
dangerous contents. Id. at 2485 n.9. Citing to Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-
300 ("hot pursuit" exception case), the Court wrote: "[E]xigent circumstances may
often justify an immediate search of property seized in conjunction with an arrest, in
12:1978
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Part II of the dissenting opinion suggested a number of alternative
courses of action that the agents could have followed without violating
the Constitution."' For example, if the agents had waited until the
respondents started driving away before seizing the car, all of its con-
tents could have been searched without a warrant under the automobile
exception." 3 "Alternatively, [the dissent said that] the agents could
have made a search of the footlocker at the time and place of the arrests,
[since] Machado and Leary were standing next to an open automobile
trunk containing the footlocker, and thus it was within the area of 'their
immediate control.' "114
The concurring opinion, written by Mr. Justice Brennan to com-
ment on the two points made by Mr. Justice Blackmun's dissent, stated:
"In my view, it is not at all obvious that the agents could legally have
searched the footlocker had they seized it after [the defendants] had
driven away with it in their car or 'at the time and place of the ar-
rests.'""5
Mr. Justice Brennan argued that it is not clear that "the contents
of locked containers found inside a car are subject to search under [the
automobile] exception."" 6 Secondly, he wrote: "I would think that the
footlocker in this case hardly was 'within [defendants'] immediate con-
trol'-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which they
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.""' 7
order to facilitate the apprehension of confederates or the termination of continuing
criminal activity." 97 S. Ct. at 2489.
112. Id. at 2489-90. No decision of the Court is cited directly to support these
conclusions; but the dissent does cite some decisions from the courts of appeals.
113. Id. at 2489. The dissent relies on the fact that "[tihe scope of the 'automobile
search' exception extends to the contents of locked compartments, including glove
compartments and trunks. . . . The courts of appeals have construed this doctrine to
include briefcases, suitcases and footlockers inside automobiles." 97 S. Ct. at 2489 n.4.
114. Id. at 2489-90. Here, the dissent gathers its argument from several view-
points. First, Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310-11 (1959) emphasized the
established principle that an immediate search of packages or luggage carried by the
arrested person is proper. Such searches have been sustained by the courts of appeals,
even if they occurred after the arrested person has been handcuffed. Finally, searches
under Chimel have also been upheld when a suitcase or briefcase was nearby, but not
touching the arrested person. 97 S. Ct. at 2490 n.5. See United States v. French, 545
F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1977) (suitcase within arm's length); United States v. Frick, 490
F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974) (briefcase lying on seat of
automobile next to which person was arrested).
115. 97 S. Ct. at 2486 (Brennan, J., concurring).
116. Id. at n.l.
117. Id. at n.2, citing from Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 763.
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While the Burger Court has been gradually strengthening the hands
of law enforcement officials, especially in the warrantless searches of
automobiles pursuant to arrest, it is significant to note one case in which
the Court finally applied the "brakes" to warrantless searches and sei-
zures. The Burger Court has, in the last several years, changed and
lowered the perception and expectation of the right of privacy. In the
past, the Court has failed to furnish or articulate guidelines applicable
to fourth amendment concerns. Again, as the dissent points out in the
Chadwick case, the Court has failed to accept the challenge to develop
an unequivocal doctrine regarding the permissible consequences of a
custodial arrest.
The Court's opinion in Chadwick merely skims the issues. It fails
to show in any significant way how the Court reached its conclusion.
Rather, it cites to numerous cases in the applicable areas of search and
seizure and leaves it to the reader to determine how these prior opinions
apply to the circumstances in Chadwick. On examining the opinions of
both the district court and the court of appeals, it would appear that
the lower courts did a far better job of analyzing and clarifying the
issues, raising subtle questions which the Supreme Court ignored.
Unfortunately, by failing to write a concise, direct opinion, the
Court left many questions unanswered. The Court did not discuss in any
great detail the problem of luggage mobility. The First Circuit pointed
out that luggage searches have raised many queries in the various cir-
cuits. It hinted that it should be left to the Supreme Court to determine
whether this could ever be a valid exception to the warrant requirement.
Secondly, under the search incident to an arrest exception, the Court
was afforded an opportunity to discus further, as the courts of appeal
have done, when it is proper for the police to seize a suitcase, briefcase,
or package in a suspect's possession at the time of arrest and, subse-
quently, to search the property without a warrant after the person has
been taken into custody. The Court does not explain in its opinion why
a possession carried in a person's clothing is subject to "reduced expec-
tations of privacy"-but not the footlocker. Further, as in South Da-
kota v. Opperman,"8 the Court did not deal with a solution to the
problems of searches of locked containers found in automobiles. Per-
haps the Court found it easier to ignore these issues by rationalizing that
these questions were not directly on appeal. However, these unanswered
118. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
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questions appear to detract from the strength of the opinion, since they
underlie some of the basic premises that the Court does examine.
The Chadwick decision seems to take a step backward in time by
attempting again to refuel the fires under the expectation of privacy
doctrine. Like the dissent, one wonders how effective this holding will
be in different circumstances, since so many other doctrines are used to
sustain warrantless searches of objects in police custody.
Robin K. Williams
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